Recordings

Plaintiffs Chris Calnan and others filed a complaint for a judgment declaring invalid a rule adopted by Maine Emergency Medical Services requiring that medical service workers be vaccinated against influenza and COVID-19. The Superior Court (Kennebec) dismissed Calnan’s complaint.

Calnan appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in determining that (1) Maine Emergency Medical Services had not exceeded their statutory authority and (2) there were no procedural defects in the promulgation of the rule. Calnan further argues that the trial court erred in declining to issue findings regarding whether the rule contravened the purposes of the Emergency Medical Services Act.  

After a jury trial, Richard Peters was convicted of hunting deer after having killed one (Class D) and unlawful possession of a wild animal or bird (Class E).  Peters appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion for a mistrial after the State offered, in the presence of the jury, evidence regarding boot prints and boots found in Peters’s home, when the court had determined that evidence regarding the boots causing those prints could be provided only through expert testimony; (2) permitting the state to change at trial the basis for the charge of unlawful possession of a wild animal or bird from Peters’s alleged illegal hunting from a standing to his alleged baiting of deer; (3) violating his double-jeopardy rights by failing to dismiss the unlawful-possession charge given his acquittal on a count charging him with violation of the statute that prohibits both baiting deer and hunting from a stand overlooking foods attractive to deer; (4) denying Peters’s requested jury instructions related to accompanying and assisting an apprentice hunter; and (5) amending his sentence from an alternative sentencing program to jail time after he appealed from the conviction.  Peters further argues that he is entited to the return of his firearms that were seized from him. 

The trial court dismissed for lack of standing Kateryna Bagrii’s complaint for adjudication of de facto parentage of two children of John Campbell.  Bagrii appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in basing its determination that Bagrii lacked standing on the fact that Bagrii’s relationship with the children was not “fostered and supported” by the children’s mother.  Campbell cross-appeals, supporting the dismissal for lack of standing but arguing that the trial court erred in excluding certain evidence contained in records of the Department of Health and Human Services.

After a jury trial, James Green was convicted of OUI (Class D).  Green appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion for discovery sanctions because the State did not designate as an expert witness the law enforcement officer who was a “drug recognition expert” and who testified about his evaluation of Green and his determination that Green was under the influence of drugs. 

The trial court granted Mark Cardilli’s petition for post-conviction review on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel and vacated Cardilli’s conviction of manslaughter (Class A).  The State of Maine appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in (1) permitting testimony from a “use of force” expert that was not relevant to the issues raised in the post-conviction petition and (2) finding that Cardilli met his burden of showing prejudice from the alleged failure of his counsel to “vigorously” argue that deadly force was necessary, given that the Law Court, in its decision on Cardilli’s appeal from the conviction, had already resolved that issue. 

Josh Rinaldi filed a complaint against the Maine Correctional Center (MCC), the Department of Corrections, and the State of Maine for a slip-and-fall injury he sustained within the MCC when he was incarcerated.  The Superior Court (Androscoggin County) granted summary judgment in part to Rinaldi.  The defendants appeal, arguing that the Superior Court erred in finding that the MCC facility is not a public building and the walkway where Rinaldi fell is not an appurtenance to a public building and that therefore the defendants—all of which are government entities—are not immune from suit under the Maine Tort Claims Act. 

Ricky and Monica Conant appeal from an order of the Superior Court (Kennebec County) finding them in contempt for obstructing Peter Beckerman’s use of a right-of-way over their driveway.  The Conants argue that the Superior Court erred because (1) the underlying order establishing Beckerman’s right-of-way does not prohibit them from temporarily blocking the driveway, (2) they acted in reasonable good faith in their interpretation that the underlying order permits their temporarily parking within the right-of-way, (3) the sanction imposed is not among the sanctions authorized by M.R. Civ. P. 66(d), and (4) certain evidence should have been barred under the doctrine of res judicata.

Jamie Pacheco appeals from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court (Androscoggin County) disqualifying her attorney, Jeffrey Bennett, Esq., because he is likely to be called as a witness.  Pacheco argues that the Superior Court erred because the defendants failed to establish a sufficient evidentiary record to support disqualification.

The Superior Court granted MMG Insurance Company a summary judgment on its claim for a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Joseph McNeely for McNeely’s actions in unintentionally causing the death of Philip Greenlaw during McNeely’s and Greenlaw’s playful wrestling.  McNeely’s landscaping business was insured by MMG, and McNeely was visiting Greenlaw’s home the evening of Greenlaw’s death in part to measure Greenlaw’s lawn to provide an estimate for services that McNeely might provide for Greenlaw.  Greenlaw’s estate appeals, arguing that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Greenlaw’s death occurred during the conduct of McNeely’s business.

The Superior Court entered judgments on claims by John R. Luongo against Michael A. Luongo, and on Michael’s counterclaims against John, regarding the distribution of property that belonged to their mother when she died. John appeals, arguing that (1) the court erred in denying John’s motion to dismiss Michael’s claim for conversion because the claim was premised on the erroneous conclusion that ownership of personal property passes to devisees immediately upon the death of the owner of the property; (2) the court exceeded its authority when it ordered replevin of personal property, in effect improperly converting Michael’s conversion claim into a replevin claim; (3) the court erred in failing to follow the procedure set out in the mother’s will for the distribution of personal property; (4) the court erred in declining to exercise jurisdiction over John’s claims seeking reimbursement for the funeral expenses and the costs of administration of the mother’s estate and trust.

Upon suspecting Nicholas Norris of trafficking in drugs, law enforcement obtained warrants in Penobscot County to track and search Norris’s vehicle.  Law enforcement stopped Norris’s vehicle near the border between Penobscot and Somerset Counties.  Norris was indicted in Penobscot County for trafficking in drugs.  Norris moved to suppress the traffic stop, and the trial court denied the motion. 

On the first day of trial, the State filed a notice of dismissal of the charges, stating that an investigation “suggested” that Norris was stopped in Somerset County more than 1,800 feet from the border with Penobscot County.  Norris objected to the dismissal, but the trial court accepted the dismissal. 

After a jury trial in Somerset County, Norris was convicted of two counts of aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs (Class A), one count of unlawful trafficking in scheduled drugs (Class B), and criminal forfeiture.  Norris appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in (1) granting the motion to dismiss the Penobscot matter without prejudice because the resulting delay violated Norris’s right to a speedy trial under the Maine and United States Constitutions and (2) denying his motion to suppress because the warrants were not supported by probable cause and law enforcement did not comply with the requirements of M.R.U. Crim. P. 41(g).