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Brookfield Power US Co. and other entitles that hold interests in hydroelectric projects in Maine (collectively Brookfield) sued the Maine Department of Marine Resources (DMR) and the Maine Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) over the agencies’ actions relating to federal licensing of the Shawmut dam.  The Superior Court dismissed the action as unripe because the federal licensing actions are still proceeding.  Brookfield appeals, arguing that (1) its claims are fit for judicial review because “they challenge ongoing illegal actions” by DMR and DEP and (2) it will suffer hardship if its claims are not resolved now because the federal courts are unlikely to reverse the final decision of the federal licensing agency decision based on a violation of state law by the agencies.

J.P. Morgan Acquisition Corp. filed a foreclosure action against Camille J. Moulton.  It later moved to dismiss the action without prejudice.  The trial court denied J.P. Morgan’s motion to dismiss the action and granted a summary judgment to Camille Moulton, determining that there was no dispute of material fact as to J.P. Morgan’s failure to properly notify Moulton of her default and opportunity to cure the default.  The trial court also declared that Moulton owned the title to the property free and clear of the mortgage. 

J.P. Morgan appeals, arguing that (1) there is a dispute of material fact regarding the validity of the notice of default and right to cure; (2) the trial court erred by declaring that Moulton owns the property free and clear of the mortgage because there was no claim, counterclaim, or other action requesting that relief; (3) the trial court erred in determining that J.P. Morgan lacked standing to foreclose without permitting J.P. Morgan to produce evidence to prove its standing; and (4) the trial court was compelled to grant its motion to dismiss without prejudice.

The Law Court invited amicus briefs and supplemental briefing of the parties on whether the Court should reconsider existing precedent that holds that a foreclosure judgment in favor of a mortgagor bars a second foreclosure action and entitles the mortgagor to a discharge of the mortgage and title to the mortgaged property.

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The District Court entered a judgment of foreclosure in favor of JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., and against Kristine Neil.  Neil appeals, arguing that (1) the court erred in determining that Chase had standing to foreclose given that the certified owner of the promissory note secured by the mortgage was not Chase but another entity; and (2) because Chase obtained a prior judgment of foreclosure in 2013, the doctrine of res judicata bars the current foreclosure action, and Chase does not have the unilateral right to “waive” the prior foreclosure judgment.

After a jury trial, Brandon Gibb was convicted of harassment (Class E); criminal threatening (Class D); stalking (Class D); and violation of a protective order (Class D).  Gibb appeals, arguing that (1) the court erred in admitting in evidence the testimony of two individuals who identified the voice on harassing phone calls as Gibb’s voice; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction for criminal threatening because there was no evidence of “physical menace”; and (3) the court erred in instructing the jury on the elements of criminal threatening by omitting a definition of “imminent” when it instructed the jury that it must find that Gibb placed the alleged victim “in fear of imminent bodily injury.”

After a jury trial, Marcus Asante was convicted of murder and robbery (Class A) and was sentenced to 35 years’ imprisonment.  Asante appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to give a self-defense instruction and that the sentence was disproportionate to the offense given that “the murder conviction was obtained on a legal theory indistinguishable from felony murder.”

After a bench trial, Bethany Ringuette was convicted of gross sexual assault.  Ringuette appealed from her conviction and her sentence, arguing that (1) because she was convicted as only an accomplice to the offense, the sentencing court erred in determining that 17-A M.R.S. § 1252(4-E) (2019) required a 20-year basic term of imprisonment, and (2) the sentencing court “both illegally and improperly imposed a lengthy term of supervised release” of ten years.

The Superior Court affirmed the decision of the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Ogunquit that considered an untimely appeal by Richard Tominsky from the decision of the Town’s code enforcement officer (CEO) issuing six building permits to 477 Shore Road LLC.  477 Shore Road LLC appeals, arguing that the Board erred in considering Tominsky’s untimely appeal because Tominsky did not show the necessary “extraordinary circumstances” that would result in a “flagrant miscarriage of justice” as required by the provisions of the Town’s ordinances permitting otherwise untimely appeals.

The Superior Court dismissed Christopher Indorf’s complaint against Heather Keep for breach of contract and a declaratory judgment relating to an alleged agreement regarding real property that the parties had purchased together.  The court determined that the action should be abated because Keep had filed a partition action regarding the property and all issues that Indorf’s complaint raised could be considered and disposed of in that partition action.  The court also awarded Keep attorney fees for defending against Indorf’s action.

Indorf appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in dismissing his action because (1) Keep never pleaded or argued abatement; (2) the remedy for abatement is a stay of the second action, not dismissal of it; (3) the count for damages for breach of contract will not be considered as part of the partition action; (4) the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure effectively abrogated the doctrine of abatement; and (5) the trial court should have consolidated the two actions regarding the real estate, as Indorf had requested.

A group of Portland voters submitted to the city a citizen’s initiative calling for public funding of candidates for city offices.  The city classified the initiative as a proposed “revision” of the city charter, which is submitted to voters only if it is first recommended by a charter commission, and not as a proposed “amendment,” which is submitted directly to voters.  See 30-A M.R.S. §§ 2102(2), 2104(2).  Fair Elections Portland and fifteen voters (collectively Fair Elections) sought judicial review in the Superior Court.  The Superior Court affirmed the city’s decision.

Fair Elections appeals, arguing that (1) the city’s process violated the voters’ due process rights because it did not consider evidence or adopt findings based on any evidence and (2) because the initiative does not call for a “profound and fundamental alteration to the essential character or core operations” of city government, it is an “amendment” to the charter, not a “revision,” and therefore must be submitted directly to the voters.

The Public Utilities Commission approved the request of Central Maine Power Company (CMP) to revise its terms and conditions relating to customers who opt out of using smart meters.  The revised terms and conditions allow CMP to replace its electromechanical meters with solid-state meters that do not transmit data via radio waves. 

The Maine Coalition to Stop Smart Meters appeals, arguing that the Commission erred by (1) relying on determinations by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) that the levels of radiofrequency (RF) radiation that the solid-state meters emit (even though they do not transmit data) are safe and failing to give deference to a decision of a federal appeals court that held that the FCC must consider recent evidence that exposure to even low levels of RF radiation may cause negative health effects; and (2) disregarding the evidence before it that there is, in fact, a “growing body of substantial evidence . . . demonstrating a credible threat of harm from low level RF radiation,” especially to the environment and to people sensitive or vulnerable to the radiation.

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