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After a jury trial, the jury found Calvin Footman guilty of domestic violence aggravated assault (Class B) and domestic violence assault (Class D), and the trial court found Footman guilty of violating a condition of release (Class E).

Footman appeals, arguing that his right under the Maine and United States Constitutions to a trial by a jury representative of the community was violated and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to subpoena the grand jurors.

Joseph Ackley filed an application for informal probate of Theodore Ackley’s estate along with a purported will dated April 2016. Later, Jean Voelker filed a petition for formal probate and a purported will dated November 2016 that was a copy of an original and did not have witness signatures. Voelker submitted affidavits alleging that the original document, which cannot be found, did have the required two signatures and was therefore an effective will.

Joseph Ackley filed an application for informal probate of Theodore Ackley’s estate along with a purported will dated April 2016. Later, Jean Voelker filed a petition for formal probate and a purported will dated November 2016 that was a copy of an original and did not have witness signatures. Voelker submitted affidavits alleging that the original document, which cannot be found, did have the required two signatures and was therefore an effective will.

Voelker appeals, arguing that the Probate Court erred in entering a judgment against Voelker because (1) it applied the wrong standard of review to the motions for judgment on the pleadings and failed to convert the motions to Rule 56 summary judgment motions and (2) the November 2016 document is a valid will under the Maine Uniform Probate Code. Voelker further argues that the Probate Court abused its discretion by denying her motion for findings, to amend the judgment, and for a new trial.

Upon suspecting Nicholas Norris of trafficking in drugs, law enforcement obtained warrants in Penobscot County to track and search Norris’s vehicle. Law enforcement initiated a traffic stop near the border between Palmyra and Newport. Norris was indicted in Penobscot County for trafficking in drugs. Norris moved to suppress the traffic stop, and the trial court denied the motion.

On the first day of trial, the State, stating that an investigation “suggested” that Norris was stopped in Somerset County more than 1,800 feet from the border with Penobscot County, moved to dismiss the matter without prejudice so that Norris could be indicted in Somerset County. The trial court granted the motion over Norris’s objection. After a jury trial in Somerset County, Norris was convicted of two counts of aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs (Class A), one count of unlawful trafficking in scheduled drugs (Class B), and criminal forfeiture.

Norris appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in (1) granting the motion to dismiss the Penobscot matter without prejudice because the resulting delay violated Norris’s right to a speedy try under the Maine and United States Constitutions and (2) denying his motion to suppress because the warrants were not supported by probable cause and law enforcement did not comply with the requirements of M.R.U. Crim. P. 41(g).

The code enforcement officer of the Town of Ogunquit issued six building permits for a single residential house lot to 477 Shore Road, LLC. Richard Tominsky, who owns a home across the street from the lot, appealed from the issuance of the permits to the town’s Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA), and the ZBA denied his appeal. Tominsky appealed to the Superior Court, which denied his appeal.

In a separate matter involving the same lot, the code enforcement officer issued a certificate of occupancy to the LLC. Tominsky appealed to the ZBA, and the ZBA determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Tomisky appealed to the Superior Court, which dismissed the complaint, determining that it failed to state a claim and was an impermissible collateral attack on the permits involved in the previous appeal.

Tominsky appeals from both final judgments of the Superior Court, arguing that the ZBA (1) erred in denying his appeal regarding the building permits and (2) violated his due process rights by entering a decision not based on substantial evidence in the record. Tominsky further argues that the Superior Court erred in dismissing his appeal regarding the certificate of occupancy because it was not of a “similar nature” to the prior building-permit appeal.

After a jury trial, Derric McLain was convicted of aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs (Class A) and violating a condition of release (Class E).  McLain appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in (1) determining that law enforcement officers had a reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the stop of the vehicle McLain was riding in and denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during the stop and (2) determining that McLain had waived his right to counsel after being read his Miranda rights and denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained in the interrogation that followed. 

The Law Court invited amicus briefs and supplemental briefs from the parties on issues relating to a defendant’s rights to counsel under the Maine Constitution before being interrogated by law enforcement.

After a jury trial, Derric McLain was convicted of aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs (Class A) and violating a condition of release (Class E).  McLain appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in (1) determining that law enforcement officers had a reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the stop of the vehicle McLain was riding in and denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during the stop and (2) determining that McLain had waived his right to counsel after being read his Miranda rights and denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained in the interrogation that followed. 

The Law Court invited amicus briefs and supplemental briefs from the parties on issues relating to a defendant’s rights to counsel under the Maine Constitution before being interrogated by law enforcement.

No Summary

In 1960, the owner of a property in the Town of Richmond died intestate. The property escheated to the State of Maine, and the State remains the title holder today. The Town, believing that it owned the property, purported to sell the property and, after a series of transfers, Wilhelmine’ Dennis Oakes purchased the property in 2008. Oakes learned of the cloud on the title and filed a complaint in the Superior Court against the Town seeking a declaratory judgment that the State is the rightful owner of the property and requesting damages for the purchase price and taxes that she had paid on the property. The Superior Court dismissed the complaint as barred by the statute of limitations and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies for an abatement of the taxes.

Oakes appeals, arguing that the Superior Court erred in (1) characterizing the suit as a quiet title action subject to the statute of limitations because the parties agree that the State holds title and the action was instead for a declaratory judgment challenging the Town’s ability to tax the property and (2) determining that Oakes may pursue a tax abatement because a void tax cannot be abated.

Among other conditions of probation, Joshua Easler was required to report to his probation officer (PO) and obtain the PO’s permission before moving. Easler’s PO moved to revoke Easler’s probation on the grounds that he failed to comply with those conditions. That PO retired before the revocation hearing. At the hearing, the State presented the retired PO’s notes and a different PO’s affidavit and testimony. The trial court determined that Easler had violated a condition of probation and revoked his probation.

Easler appeals, arguing that the trial court violated his due process rights in considering the hearsay testimony of the PO who did not have personal knowledge of the alleged violations.

Nicholas Norris was charged in Penobscot County with aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs (Class A), unlawful trafficking of scheduled drugs (Class B), and criminal forfeiture.  On the day that the trial was scheduled to begin, the State moved to dismiss the charges without prejudice on the ground that they had been brought in the wrong county.  Over Norris’s objection, the court dismissed the charges. 

Norris was then charged for the same conduct in Somerset County.  After a jury trial, Norris was convicted of two counts of trafficking of scheduled drugs (Class A), unlawful trafficking in scheduled drugs (Class B), and criminal forfeiture.  After a jury trial, Norris was convicted of all charges and ordered to forfeit related property.

Norris appeals, arguing that (1) the dismissal of the Penobscot County charges on the day of trial and the refiling of the charges in Somerset County violated his rights to a speedy trial; and (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because there was insufficient information to support the finding of probable cause in the issuance of two warrants that led to the discovery of certain evidence.

The District Court entered a judgment of divorce between the parties.  Daniel Bolduc appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court did not have jurisdiction to determine that Sarah’s father still owned a one-half interest in the marital home, which Sarah and her father had purchased during the marriage as joint tenants but which her father did not contribute to after the initial purchase, because Sarah’s father is not a party to the divorce action; and (2) considering the value of the marital home at the time that the parties separated, rather than at the time of entry of judgment, in determining the property division between the parties.