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The Business and Consumer Docket (BCD) entered a summary judgment affirming the State Tax Assessor’s apportionment of the income of Express Scripts, Inc., and its related businesses for tax years 2011, 2012, and 2013. Express Scripts appeals, arguing that (1) the BCD erred by applying the wrong legal standard to its claims; (2) the BCD erred in its “factual findings” that it did not provide a bundle of services to its clients and that it provided prescription drugs to retail pharmacies; and (3) the Assessor was not entitled to summary judgment because there is a genuine dispute of material fact and the Assessor is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The State Tax Assessor cross-appeals, arguing that the BCD abused its discretion in sealing certain parts of the summary judgment record.

After a jury trial, Corey Farley was convicted of gross sexual assault (Class A) and unlawful sexual contact (Class B). Farley appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress an audio recording of a detective’s interview of him in a patrol car because the statements were involuntary and were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona because Farley was in custody and was not advised of his rights and (2) the prosecutor improperly mischaracterized the evidence regarding his deafness, improperly gave his own opinion on Farley’s credibility and vouched for the credibility of the State’s witnesses, and provided his own opinion on the meaning of emojis in a text message between Farley and the victim.

In Franklin Savings Bank’s complaint for forcible entry and detainer of personal property, the Business and Consumer Docket (BCD) awarded to Franklin Savings Bank possession of a camp on which it had a security interest to secure a loan that it had made to Michael and Monica Bordick. The Bordicks appeal, arguing that the BCD erred by (1) excluding extrinsic evidence of the purpose of the loan merely because the loan documents stated that the loan was for commercial purposes especially given that there was an issue regarding whether the federal Truth-In-Lending Act applied to the loan; (2) determining that the loan documents unambiguously established that the loan was for commercial purposes; and (3) ordering that the Bordicks allow the Bank unimpeded access to the camp given that the Bordicks’ lease to the land on which the camp sits has not been transferred to the Bank.

The Superior Court declared the parties’ rights to two paper streets that abut the parties’ properties, which are near Owls Head Harbor. John and Christine Carter appeal, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) determining that a road terminated before reaching the harbor where the deed called for the road to extend “to the shore”; (2) determining that the Carters’ neighbors had obtained title to portions of the roads through adverse possession because the neighbors’ possession was not exclusive, hostile, or under a claim of right; and (3) establishing an “adverse possession boundary” along the centerline of a road that was “unrelated to any actual use or occupation.”

The Carters’ neighbors, Michael and N. Kermit Voncannon and Zachary and Kathryn Rogers (through their trust), cross-appeal, arguing that the Superior Court erred by determining that they had not proved that they owned to the centerlines of the paper streets through the doctrines of parol agreement, practical location, or acquiescence.

The District Court denied Karl Bechtel’s motion to extend an order against Jody Green for protection of the parties’ child from abuse and entered an order determining the parties’ parental rights to the child. Bechtel appeals, arguing that (1) the court erred by excluding Karl from the courtroom for the second day of the hearing on parental rights, allowing him to testify only through Zoom, because of Karl’s behavior in the courtroom; (2) the court erred by not permitting the child to testify at the hearings in the matters; (3) the court applied the wrong legal standard in its consideration of Bechtel’s motion to extend the protection-from-abuse order; (4) the court erred in granting Green primary residence of the child after finding that Green had abused the child, without making the statutorily required findings or imposing the statutorily required conditions; and (5) the court’s findings are not supported by the evidence and the court abused its discretion in making its allocation of parental rights and responsibilities.

The Superior Court entered a judgment of foreclosure in favor of Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC, and against Roy L. Brisley. Brisley appeals, arguing that Carrington did not have standing to pursue foreclosure against him because Brisley’s mortgage to Key Financial Services had not been validly assigned to Carrington because Key was dissolved several years before it purportedly transferred the mortgage to Carrington.

After a jury trial, Jarae Lipscombe was convicted of hindering apprehension or prosecution. Lipscombe appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to voir dire to discover the effect of a witness’s utterance of “good luck” to the jury as the witness was leaving the courtroom, which was described to the court in an off-the-record exchange between the court and jurors after the trial and outside the presence of counsel and Lipscombe; (2) shifting to Lipscombe the burden of producing evidence of the motive of witnesses to lie by instructing the jury that it may consider “whether there has been any evidence introduced of any motive or lack of motive for a witness to exaggerate or lie.”

The District Court terminated Barni A.’s parental rights to her child. Barni appeals, arguing that the court erred in terminating her parental rights because the sole factual basis for the court’s termination of her rights—that she was unable to adequately care for her severely disabled child—is insufficient to establish parental unfitness because she would be able to parent the child if the state provided the child with the “24/7 nursing care” that he is entitled to.

Robert Connary et al. (collectively, the Connary Heirs) appeal from an order of the Superior Court granting summary judgment in favor of Richard Shea et al. on the Connary Heirs’ claim for reformation of a Trust. The Connary Heirs argue that the Superior Court erred in (1) excluding as inadmissible hearsay certain statements made by the grantor of the trust offered by the Connary Heirs to show that the trust was affected by a mistake of fact or law and to establish the intent of the grantor and (2) concluding that that the Connary Heirs had failed to generate a genuine issue of material fact on the reformation claim and entering summary judgment in favor of the Sheas

The Superior Court entered judgments on claims by John R. Luongo against Michael A. Luongo, and on Michael’s counterclaims against John, regarding the distribution of property that belonged to their mother when she died. John appeals, arguing that (1) the court erred in denying John’s motion to dismiss Michael’s claim for conversion because the claim was premised on the erroneous conclusion that ownership of personal property passes to devisees immediately upon the death of the owner of the property; (2) the court exceeded its authority when it ordered replevin of personal property, in effect improperly converting Michael’s conversion claim into a replevin claim; (3) the court erred in failing to follow the procedure set out in the mother’s will for the distribution of personal property; (4) the court erred in declining to exercise jurisdiction over John’s claims seeking reimbursement for the funeral expenses and the costs of administration of the mother’s estate and trust.

Upon suspecting Nicholas Norris of trafficking in drugs, law enforcement obtained warrants in Penobscot County to track and search Norris’s vehicle.  Law enforcement stopped Norris’s vehicle near the border between Penobscot and Somerset Counties.  Norris was indicted in Penobscot County for trafficking in drugs.  Norris moved to suppress the traffic stop, and the trial court denied the motion. 

On the first day of trial, the State filed a notice of dismissal of the charges, stating that an investigation “suggested” that Norris was stopped in Somerset County more than 1,800 feet from the border with Penobscot County.  Norris objected to the dismissal, but the trial court accepted the dismissal. 

After a jury trial in Somerset County, Norris was convicted of two counts of aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs (Class A), one count of unlawful trafficking in scheduled drugs (Class B), and criminal forfeiture.  Norris appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in (1) granting the motion to dismiss the Penobscot matter without prejudice because the resulting delay violated Norris’s right to a speedy trial under the Maine and United States Constitutions and (2) denying his motion to suppress because the warrants were not supported by probable cause and law enforcement did not comply with the requirements of M.R.U. Crim. P. 41(g).

The Probate Court issued a judgment, based on a referee’s report, determining the distribution of the Estate of Erica O’Donnell between Christopher O’Donnell, Erica’s surviving spouse and personal representative, and Erica’s parents. Christopher appeals, arguing that (1) the referee and Probate Court erred in applying former Title 18-A of the Maine Revised Statutes, which was in effect at the time of Erica’s death, and not Title 18-C, which had replaced Title 18-A effective before the referee’s hearing, in determining the distribution; (2) the Probate Court violated his due process rights by failing to hold a hearing on his objections to the referee’s report and failing to address the deficiencies in the referee’s procedures regarding discovery; and (3) the referee, and therefore the court, erred in distributing Erica’s estate by ordering Christopher to repay the estate as a sanction for his alleged discovery violations, by assigning no value to the personal property distributed to Erica’s parents before the contested proceedings began, and by ordering the estate to pay Erica’s father’s attorney fees.

The Public Utilities Commission approved a second amendment to a special rate contract between Bangor Natural Gas Company and Bucksport Generation LLC. The Office of the Public Advocate appeals, arguing that the Commission erred by approving the special rate contract because (1) the rates are not just and reasonable because there was no evidence justifying the need for a special rate contract, there was no evidence showing the extent of the discount from Bangor Natural Gas’s regular rates that Bucksport Generation is receiving or showing that Bucksport Generation could not afford a higher rate; (2) the rates in the contract constitute an undue and unreasonable preference and advantage to Bucksport Generation and an undue and unreasonable disadvantage to other customers of Bangor Natural Gas; and (3) no evidentiary record was established by the Commission, resulting in a lack of a factual basis for the Commission’s decision.

After a jury trial, Bobby L. Nightingale was convicted of two counts of murder, (Class C), two counts of illegal possession of a firearm (Class C), and criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon (Class C). He was sentenced to life in prison plus a term of five years to be served consecutively to the life imprisonment. Nightingale appeals from the conviction and from the sentence, arguing that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial after the prosecutor referenced the jurors’ significant civic duty to serve as jurors, improperly told the jury that it “must” find Nightingale guilty, and improperly told the jury that Nightingale’s evidence was not believable; (2) the court erred in giving the jury an instruction on accomplice liability because the evidence did not generate the instruction; (3) the court abused its discretion by not allowing Nightingale to question a detective regarding the detective’s hearing multiple calls between Nightingale and his attorney while Nightingale was in jail; and (4) in sentencing Nightingale, the court erred by not considering other sentences for similar offenses in the first step of the sentencing analysis.

The Superior Court vacated the Aroostook County Commissioners’ determination that they did not have jurisdiction under 36 M.R.S. § 844 to consider the appeal of Cassidy Holdings, LLC, from the denial by the City of Caribou Board of Assessors for an abatement of property taxes for land that Cassidy owned. The county commissioners appeal, arguing that the Superior Court erred in its interpretation of section 844(1) and (2), and that those subsections give exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of denials of property tax abatements to the State Board of Property Tax Review.

Alexander Russell appeals from a judgment of the Unified Criminal Docket convicting him of gross sexual assault (Class A), gross sexual assault (Class B), unlawful sexual contact (Class B), unlawful sexual contact (Class C), and unlawful sexual touching (Class D).  Russell argues that the trial court erred by (1) denying his request to instruct the jury that a poor-quality police investigation into the alleged crimes can raise reasonable doubt about a defendant’s guilt; (2) failing to give a specific-unanimity instruction; (3) instructing the jury that they could consider whether there was evidence of a motive or lack of motive for any witness to lie; and (4) increasing his sentence because of his “lack of remorse” when there was no evidence to support a finding of a “lack of remorse.”

Brian J. Fournier appeals from orders of the Business and Consumer Docket (BCD) (Duddy, J.) (1) dismissing his claims against Flats Industrial, Inc., and three individual fellow shareholders (collectively Flats) for breach of fiduciary duty and (2) denying his motion to amend his complaint for a third time. Fournier argues that the BCD erred in (1) determining that amending his complaint for a third time would be futile; (2) determining that his direct claim for breach of fiduciary duty was not a proper direct claim but was a derivative claim, given that he had alleged that the other shareholders had denied him his right to vote as a shareholder; and (3) dismissing his derivative claim given that Flats’s denial of his request to the corporation to take action on some of his claims was wrongful, and he was not required to make a request of the corporation on all his claims because making a request on the remaining claims would have been futile.

Flats moved to dismiss Fournier’s appeal as untimely because the appeal was filed more than 21 days after the stipulation of dismissal that disposed of the last of Fournier’s claims against them. The Law Court ordered that the motion be considered with the merits of the appeal. Fournier argues that a motion for a protective order that Flats filed with the stipulation of dismissal prevented the stipulation of dismissal from constituting a final judgment.