Supreme Judicial Court Calendar

Josh Rinaldi filed a complaint against the Maine Correctional Center (MCC), the Department of Corrections, and the State of Maine for a slip-and-fall injury he sustained within the MCC when he was incarcerated.  The Superior Court (Androscoggin County) granted summary judgment in part to Rinaldi.  The defendants appeal, arguing that the Superior Court erred in finding that the MCC facility is not a public building and the walkway where Rinaldi fell is not an appurtenance to a public building and that therefore the defendants—all of which are government entities—are not immune from suit under the Maine Tort Claims Act. 

The District Court granted the petition of a three-year-old child’s biological aunt and the aunt’s partner to adopt the child and, at the same time, denied the petition for adoption of the child filed by the child’s half-sister’s grandparents (who are not biologically related to the child), with whom the child had been living for most of his life after having been removed from his biological parents in a child protection action.  The child’s half-sister’s grandparents appeal, arguing that (1) in making its best interest determinations, the court failed to prioritize the child’s need for permanency and (2) the court erred by applying the statutory “kinship preference” in an adoption proceeding when the child had not been placed with relatives earlier in the child protection process.

Jamie Pacheco appeals from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court (Androscoggin County) disqualifying her attorney, Jeffrey Bennett, Esq., because he is likely to be called as a witness.  Pacheco argues that the Superior Court erred because the defendants failed to establish a sufficient evidentiary record to support disqualification.

The Superior Court granted MMG Insurance Company a summary judgment on its claim for a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Joseph McNeely for McNeely’s actions in unintentionally causing the death of Philip Greenlaw during McNeely’s and Greenlaw’s playful wrestling.  McNeely’s landscaping business was insured by MMG, and McNeely was visiting Greenlaw’s home the evening of Greenlaw’s death in part to measure Greenlaw’s lawn to provide an estimate for services that McNeely might provide for Greenlaw.  Greenlaw’s estate appeals, arguing that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Greenlaw’s death occurred during the conduct of McNeely’s business.

The Superior Court entered judgments on claims by John R. Luongo against Michael A. Luongo, and on Michael’s counterclaims against John, regarding the distribution of property that belonged to their mother when she died. John appeals, arguing that (1) the court erred in denying John’s motion to dismiss Michael’s claim for conversion because the claim was premised on the erroneous conclusion that ownership of personal property passes to devisees immediately upon the death of the owner of the property; (2) the court exceeded its authority when it ordered replevin of personal property, in effect improperly converting Michael’s conversion claim into a replevin claim; (3) the court erred in failing to follow the procedure set out in the mother’s will for the distribution of personal property; (4) the court erred in declining to exercise jurisdiction over John’s claims seeking reimbursement for the funeral expenses and the costs of administration of the mother’s estate and trust.

Upon suspecting Nicholas Norris of trafficking in drugs, law enforcement obtained warrants in Penobscot County to track and search Norris’s vehicle.  Law enforcement stopped Norris’s vehicle near the border between Penobscot and Somerset Counties.  Norris was indicted in Penobscot County for trafficking in drugs.  Norris moved to suppress the traffic stop, and the trial court denied the motion. 

On the first day of trial, the State filed a notice of dismissal of the charges, stating that an investigation “suggested” that Norris was stopped in Somerset County more than 1,800 feet from the border with Penobscot County.  Norris objected to the dismissal, but the trial court accepted the dismissal. 

After a jury trial in Somerset County, Norris was convicted of two counts of aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs (Class A), one count of unlawful trafficking in scheduled drugs (Class B), and criminal forfeiture.  Norris appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in (1) granting the motion to dismiss the Penobscot matter without prejudice because the resulting delay violated Norris’s right to a speedy trial under the Maine and United States Constitutions and (2) denying his motion to suppress because the warrants were not supported by probable cause and law enforcement did not comply with the requirements of M.R.U. Crim. P. 41(g).

Robbery; elevated aggravated assault; kidnapping; burglary; cruelty to animals; subpoena for business records of victim; warrantless search of cell phone found at scene of alleged crime

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The Business and Consumer Docket (BCD) dismissed the claims of several Maine hospitals for negligence, fraud, unjust enrichment, and conspiracy against several manufacturers, marketers, distributers, and sellers of prescription opioids.  The hospitals appeal, arguing that the BCD erred by (1) ignoring facts alleged in the complaint and dismissing the complaint without providing an opportunity for the hospitals to amend the complaint; (2) determining as a matter of law that the injuries to public health caused by the defendants’ actions did not constitute a public nuisance and caused “special injury” to the hospitals; (3) determining that the defendants were not liable for the hospitals’ injuries caused by the foreseeable unreasonable risk of harm that the defendants created; (4) creating a privity requirement for an unjust enrichment claim; (5) requiring for the fraud claims allegations of injury to each hospital caused by specific statements directly to that hospital; (6) determining that the hospitals failed to sufficiently plead that defendants’ conduct proximately caused the hospitals’ injuries; and (7) determining that the harm pleaded by the hospitals is too speculative to support recovery of damages.

The Town of Kennebunkport appeals from the Superior Court’s determination that its code enforcement officer erred as a matter of law in denying the application of 15 Langsford Owner LLC for short-term-rental licenses for eleven condominium units on its property, arguing that the code enforcement officer correctly found that the property was being used as an inn or hotel in 2021 and therefore the units were not “legally existing residential dwelling units” that would qualify for short-term-rental licenses.

After a jury trial, the Superior Court entered judgment for the Estate of Peter A. Smith and against John R. Henson, Mercy Hospital, and Eastern Maine Healthcare Systems in the amount of $4,000,000 on the Estate’s wrongful death claim alleging medical malpractice.   The award included an amount equal to the present value of Peter Smith’s projected lifetime earnings. Henson, Mercy, and Eastern Maine Healthcare appeal, arguing that Maine’s wrongful death statute does not permit an award for pecuniary loss where the Estate has not proved that the statutory beneficiaries—here, Peter Smith’s parents—were deprived by the death of a present or future economic advantage.   

The Superior Court vacated the Aroostook County Commissioners’ determination that they did not have jurisdiction under 36 M.R.S. § 844 to consider the appeal of Cassidy Holdings, LLC, from the denial by the City of Caribou Board of Assessors for an abatement of property taxes for land that Cassidy owned. The county commissioners appeal, arguing that the Superior Court erred in its interpretation of section 844(1) and (2), and that those subsections give exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of denials of property tax abatements to the State Board of Property Tax Review.

Alexander Russell appeals from a judgment of the Unified Criminal Docket convicting him of gross sexual assault (Class A), gross sexual assault (Class B), unlawful sexual contact (Class B), unlawful sexual contact (Class C), and unlawful sexual touching (Class D).  Russell argues that the trial court erred by (1) denying his request to instruct the jury that a poor-quality police investigation into the alleged crimes can raise reasonable doubt about a defendant’s guilt; (2) failing to give a specific-unanimity instruction; (3) instructing the jury that they could consider whether there was evidence of a motive or lack of motive for any witness to lie; and (4) increasing his sentence because of his “lack of remorse” when there was no evidence to support a finding of a “lack of remorse.”

Brian J. Fournier appeals from orders of the Business and Consumer Docket (BCD) (Duddy, J.) (1) dismissing his claims against Flats Industrial, Inc., and three individual fellow shareholders (collectively Flats) for breach of fiduciary duty and (2) denying his motion to amend his complaint for a third time. Fournier argues that the BCD erred in (1) determining that amending his complaint for a third time would be futile; (2) determining that his direct claim for breach of fiduciary duty was not a proper direct claim but was a derivative claim, given that he had alleged that the other shareholders had denied him his right to vote as a shareholder; and (3) dismissing his derivative claim given that Flats’s denial of his request to the corporation to take action on some of his claims was wrongful, and he was not required to make a request of the corporation on all his claims because making a request on the remaining claims would have been futile.

Flats moved to dismiss Fournier’s appeal as untimely because the appeal was filed more than 21 days after the stipulation of dismissal that disposed of the last of Fournier’s claims against them. The Law Court ordered that the motion be considered with the merits of the appeal. Fournier argues that a motion for a protective order that Flats filed with the stipulation of dismissal prevented the stipulation of dismissal from constituting a final judgment.

On a complaint filed by Geoffrey and Carolyn Stiff challenging the decision of the Town of Belgrade Planning Board approving an after-the-fact permit for the Stiffs’ neighbors to build a two-story structure on their building as an “accessory structure,” the Superior Court affirmed the Planning Board’s decision. The Stiffs appeal, arguing that the Planning Board (1) failed to make sufficient factual findings; (2) erred in determining that the two-story structure is a permitted “accessory structure”; and (3) erred in calculating the floor area of the structure.

Heather Keep filed an action for partition of real property that she and Christopher Indorf had purchased together and held as joint tenants. The Superior Court ordered that Indorf buy Keep’s equity in the property for a specified price and that, if Indorf is unable to obtain financing, the property be sold and the proceeds divided in a specified manner.

Indorf appeals, and Keep cross-appeals. Indorf’s major arguments are that the court erred in declining to enforce a settlement agreement between the parties and that Keep’s cross-appeal is untimely. Keep’s major arguments are that her cross-appeal was timely, the settlement agreement that Indorf relies on was not enforceable, and the trial court erred in declining to consolidate this matter with a breach-of-contract matter between the parties.

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The trial court denied Dennis Winchester’s petitions for post-conviction review of his convictions for various burglaries and thefts. On appeal, Winchester argues that his attorneys in the original criminal proceedings provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to pursue speedy-trial claims in the trial court and on appeal. This Court invited amicus briefs to address whether Winchester’s right to a speedy trial was violated under article 1, section 6 of the Maine Constitution or under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

The Superior Court granted summary judgment and awarded damages to the State of Maine in its suit against Moosehead Mountain Resort that sought to enforce covenants on a ski area once owned by the state and now owned by Moosehead, to ensure that the land remained available to the public. Moosehead appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in determining that (1) the deed to a predecessor-in-interest of Moosehead’s required that the land be maintained in a certain way; (2) a covenant can run with the land without a benefited parcel, (3) there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding whether a certain parcel retained by the State was a benefitted parcel or whether the defense of latches applied, (4) the ambiguities in the deed regarding the covenants must be resolved in favor of the state, (5) the covenant requiring that the land be available for “public use” is reasonable, and (6) the state was not required to give notice of its interpretation of the public-use covenant before suing Moosehead.

The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Francis and Maryann Janusz on their complaint for foreclosure against Eric Bacon. Bacon appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in determining that (1) the parties had completed mediation, which is a statutory prerequisite to a judgment of foreclosure; and (2) Bacon received proper notice of the motion for summary judgment even though the Januszes did not mail a copy of the motion to Bacon’s address of record.

In 2018, while she was the subject of a guardianship and conservatorship, Patricia Spofford executed a will that was admitted to probate upon her death. Spofford’s sons, Michael Zani and Peter Zani, filed suit in the Superior Court seeking a declaratory judgment that their mother lacked testamentary capacity when she executed the 2018 will and the imposition of a constructive trust on Spofford’s property, and alleging wrongful interference with an expectancy of inheritance against a beneficiary of the will and fraud against a witness to the will.

The Superior Court entered summary judgment against the Zanis on all counts. The Zanis appeal, arguing that the Superior Court erred in determining that there was no dispute of material fact regarding Spofford’s testamentary capacity on the date that she executed the 2018 will given that there was evidence of Spofford’s lack of testamentary capacity both before and after that date.