Supreme Judicial Court Calendar

Brett Deane and others sued Central Maine Power Company (CMP) for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, violation of 35-A M.R.S. § 1501 (2023), violation of the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act, and intentional infliction of emotional distress relating to disconnection notices that CMP issued to residential customers during the winter.  The court granted CMP’s motion to dismiss all claims except the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and later granted CMP’s motion for summary judgment on that claim. 

Deane and the others appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in (1) dismissing their claims for misrepresentation because they alleged a pecuniary injury with sufficient particularity, (2) dismissing their claim under 35-A M.R.S. § 1501 because there is cognizable harm and the statute includes a private right of action, and (3) granting the summary judgment motion, because there are genuine issues of material fact as to the severity of their emotional distress.

In 2003, to offset a potential rate increase due to the closure of the paper mill in Millinocket, the predecessor to the Maine water Company-Millinocket Division (MWC) sought and received from the Public Utilities Commission a waiver of depreciation rates under Chapter 68 of the Commission’s rules.  The waiver was renewed several times from 2005 through 2014.  In 2022, the Commission, relying on a provision in Chapter 110 of its rules, granted a renewed waiver over the objection of the Office of the Public Advocate.

The Public Advocate appeals, arguing that (1) the Commission erred in relying on Chapter 110 to grant the waiver because Chapter 68 includes its own waiver provision; (2) the Commission abused its discretion by setting unjust and unreasonable rates by approving an arbitrary depreciation rate; and (3) the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support the Commission’s order. 

After a jury trial, Jacob R. Labbe Sr. was convicted of one count of domestic violence stalking (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 210-C(1)(B)(3) (2018) (Count 1), and two counts of violation of a protection order (Class D), 19-A M.R.S. § 4011(1) (2018) (Counts 2 and 3).  The trial court sentenced Labbe to two and a half years’ imprisonment on Count 1 and one year’s imprisonment for both Counts 2 and 3, with the sentences to run concurrently.  Labbe appeals, arguing (among other things) that Maine's stalking statute, 17-A M.R.S. § 210-A, which forms the basis for the enhanced charge in 17-A M.R.S. § 210-C, is void for vagueness because a reasonable person would not have understood, and he did not understand, that Labbe's texts and calls to the alleged victim would cause a reasonable person to suffer serious inconvenience or emotional distress.  

This Court held oral argument on Labbe’s appeal from the conviction on May 9, 2023.  After that, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in Counterman v. Colorado, 143 S. Ct. 2016 (2023), vacating a similar conviction under Colorado’s stalking statute.  This Court asked the parties to brief the effect, if any, that the Supreme Court’s decision has on Labbe’s case and whether due to principles of issue preservation and retroactivity, this Court should address the issues discussed in Counterman. 

Jennifer Goodwin sued Randa Charland and others, claiming that Charland and the others engaged in wrongdoing that resulted in Goodwin not inheriting property from her deceased father.  The Superior Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss a first amended complaint, granted the defendants’ motion to strike a second amended complaint that joined Christine Catchick as a plaintiff, and dismissed all other pending motions as moot.  Catchick and Goodwin appeal, arguing that in striking the second amended complaint the trial court erred in concluding that Goodwin had not timely joined Catchick as a plaintiff pursuant to an earlier order requiring her to do so.  Goodwin also argues that the court erred in determining that her first amended complaint was deficient because it did not join certain persons as parties.  The Estate of Randa Charland, which was substituted for Charland as a party to the appeal after Charland died, argues that the appeal should be dismissed as untimely.

The District Court denied Karl Bechtel’s motion to extend an order against Jody Green for protection of the parties’ child from abuse and entered an order determining the parties’ parental rights to the child. Bechtel appeals, arguing that (1) the court erred by excluding Karl from the courtroom for the second day of the hearing on parental rights, allowing him to testify only through Zoom, because of Karl’s behavior in the courtroom; (2) the court erred by not permitting the child to testify at the hearings in the matters; (3) the court applied the wrong legal standard in its consideration of Bechtel’s motion to extend the protection-from-abuse order; (4) the court erred in granting Green primary residence of the child after finding that Green had abused the child, without making the statutorily required findings or imposing the statutorily required conditions; and (5) the court’s findings are not supported by the evidence and the court abused its discretion in making its allocation of parental rights and responsibilities.

Nicholas P. Lovejoy entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of murder, 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A) (2023).  The trial court sentenced Lovejoy to a term of forty-two years’ incarceration.  On appeal, Lovejoy argues that the trial court erred in (1) denying Lovejoy’s motion to suppress because there was no reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the traffic stop of his car after which he was arrested on other charges, (2) denying Lovejoy’s motion to suppress the search of his home because the presence of unattended children in a home is not an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless entry, and (3) considering Lovejoy’s mental state and “post murder conduct” in step two of the sentencing analysis rather than in step one.

Erica Brooks and Victoria Smith brought this action against the Town of Bar Harbor for a judgment declaring that certain amendments to the Town’s Land Use Ordinance, regarding short-term rentals of property, were void.  Brooks and Smith claimed that the amendments were not properly adopted because (1) the Town’s code requires that an amendment be approved by two-thirds of the voters in a referendum unless the Town’s Planning Board has recommended approval of the amendment and (2) the Planning Board voted 2-2 on whether to recommend approval.  The Superior Court entered summary judgment for the Town, noting that the Town code required the Planning Board to provide a recommendation either for or against the amendments and concluding that the tie vote resulted in the Planning Board “never discharg[ing] its duty of providing a yes or no recommendation.”   
 
Brooks and Smith appeal, arguing that the Planning Board’s tie vote meant that the Planning Board did not recommend the proposed amendment, not that the Planning Board failed to act. 

The Superior Court denied a motion of the Government Oversight Committee of the Maine State Legislature seeking to compel the Maine Department of Health and Human Services to comply with a subpoena to produce child protection case files pertaining to four named children.  The Committee appeals, arguing that it has (1) the power under Maine Sugar Industries, Inc. v. Maine Industrial Building Authority, 264 A.2d 1 (Me. 1970), to compel an agency to disclose confidential information via a subpoena and (2) express authority to obtain confidential information from the Department under 22 M.R.S. § 4008.

Robert Connary et al. (collectively, the Connary Heirs) appeal from an order of the Superior Court granting summary judgment in favor of Richard Shea et al. on the Connary Heirs’ claim for reformation of a Trust. The Connary Heirs argue that the Superior Court erred in (1) excluding as inadmissible hearsay certain statements made by the grantor of the trust offered by the Connary Heirs to show that the trust was affected by a mistake of fact or law and to establish the intent of the grantor and (2) concluding that that the Connary Heirs had failed to generate a genuine issue of material fact on the reformation claim and entering summary judgment in favor of the Sheas

The Superior Court entered judgments on claims by John R. Luongo against Michael A. Luongo, and on Michael’s counterclaims against John, regarding the distribution of property that belonged to their mother when she died. John appeals, arguing that (1) the court erred in denying John’s motion to dismiss Michael’s claim for conversion because the claim was premised on the erroneous conclusion that ownership of personal property passes to devisees immediately upon the death of the owner of the property; (2) the court exceeded its authority when it ordered replevin of personal property, in effect improperly converting Michael’s conversion claim into a replevin claim; (3) the court erred in failing to follow the procedure set out in the mother’s will for the distribution of personal property; (4) the court erred in declining to exercise jurisdiction over John’s claims seeking reimbursement for the funeral expenses and the costs of administration of the mother’s estate and trust.

Upon suspecting Nicholas Norris of trafficking in drugs, law enforcement obtained warrants in Penobscot County to track and search Norris’s vehicle.  Law enforcement stopped Norris’s vehicle near the border between Penobscot and Somerset Counties.  Norris was indicted in Penobscot County for trafficking in drugs.  Norris moved to suppress the traffic stop, and the trial court denied the motion. 

On the first day of trial, the State filed a notice of dismissal of the charges, stating that an investigation “suggested” that Norris was stopped in Somerset County more than 1,800 feet from the border with Penobscot County.  Norris objected to the dismissal, but the trial court accepted the dismissal. 

After a jury trial in Somerset County, Norris was convicted of two counts of aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs (Class A), one count of unlawful trafficking in scheduled drugs (Class B), and criminal forfeiture.  Norris appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in (1) granting the motion to dismiss the Penobscot matter without prejudice because the resulting delay violated Norris’s right to a speedy trial under the Maine and United States Constitutions and (2) denying his motion to suppress because the warrants were not supported by probable cause and law enforcement did not comply with the requirements of M.R.U. Crim. P. 41(g).