Supreme Judicial Court Calendar

In the divorce action between Helge Reimann and Kristina Toland, a referee issued a report that recommended that (1) Toland be permitted to move out of state with the parties’ child and (2) Toland be granted attorney fees despite a provision in the parties’ premarital agreement prohibiting an award of attorney fees in the event of a divorce because the provision is against public policy and therefore unenforceable. Riemann objected to those provisions of the referee’s report. The District Court adopted the referee’s report as a judgment of the court over Riemann’s objections.

Riemann appeals, arguing that (1) it is not in the child’s best interest to permit Toland to move out of state with the child and (2) the prohibition on attorney fees in the otherwise valid premarital agreement is not against public policy and therefore Toland is not entitled to any attorney fees.

Karen Klein slipped, fell, and was injured on a patch of ice in a parking lot between buildings at the University of Maine.  Klein sued the University of Maine System, and the Superior Court granted summary judgment to the System, determining that the System was immune from liability under the Maine Tort Claims Act and rejecting Klein’s argument that the System was not immune from her claim because the parking lot was an “appurtenance” to a public building.

Klein appeals, arguing that this Court should revisit its decision in Kitchen v. City of Calais, 666 A.2d 77 (Me. 1995), which held that a government parking lot is not an “appurtenance” to a public building as that term is used in 14 M.R.S.  � 8104-A(2), because that decision was based on the plaintiffs’ failure to support their opposition to the City’s motion for summary judgment with evidence.  Klein argues that the parties’ stipulated facts establish that the parking lot where she was injured is an appurtenance to a public building and that the Superior Court therefore erred in granting summary judgment to the System.

The Department of Marine Resources granted an aquaculture lease to Mere Point Oyster Company to farm 35 acres of subtidal land in Maquoit Bay in Brunswick.  Paul and Kathleen Dioli and their company Maquoit Bay LLC (collectively the Diolis), owners of shorefront property near the lease, challenged the lease at hearings before the Department and then appealed to the Superior Court.  The Superior Court ruled against the Diolis on all but one count of their complaint and certified that the denial was a final judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1).

The Diolis appeal to the Law Court, arguing that the Department erred in granting the lease because (1) the decision violates the Public Trust Doctrine because it failed to consider whether practicable alternatives would have less impact on existing and surrounding uses, (2) the decision was impermissibly influenced by Daniel Deveraux, who attended a pre-application meeting regarding the lease application in his official capacity as the harbormaster and marine patrol officer for the Town of Brunswick despite being one of two members of Mere Point Oyster Company, (3) the Department improperly dismissed testimony from owners of neighboring land whose property is more than 1000 feet from the boundary of the lease although the relevant statute requires the Department to consider unreasonable interference with the ingress and egress of all “riparian owners,” (4) the Department impermissibly shifted the burden of proof and persuasion from the applicants to the intervening riparian owners, and (5) the Department failed to properly designate the lease proposal as a “discharge application.”

Kyle Berounsky sued his former employer, Oceanside Rubbish, Inc., in Superior Court for disability discrimination, alleging two counts of violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and two counts of violation of the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA).  Oceanside removed the matter to federal court and moved to dismiss the complaint.  The federal court dismissed the two ADA counts and remanded the MHRA counts to the Superior Court.  Oceanside then moved in the Superior Court to dismiss the MHRA counts.  The Superior Court granted the motion, determining that the claims were time-barred because Berounsky was terminated from his employment more than two years before he filed his complaint.

Berounsky appeals, arguing that the Superior Court erred by drawing inferences against him in determining the date of Oceanside’s alleged discriminatory act, thereby failing to apply the correct standard in its determination of the motion to dismiss.

Attorney Neal Weinstein filed a complaint with the Board of Dental Practice against Marina Narowetz for her failure to provide him with records of a patient that he was authorized to obtain.  Narowetz then filed complaints against Weinstein with the Maine Board of Overseers of the Bar, the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers, and the United States Postal Service.

Weinstein sued Narowetz and her practice, Old Orchard Beach Family Dentistry, LLC (collectively Narowetz), for defamation, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligence, with a claim for punitive damages, for the statements that Narowetz made to the dental board, the boards of overseers, and the postal service.  Narowetz moved to dismiss the complaint both for failure to state a claim and pursuant to 14 M.R.S.  � 556 (2021)—Maine’s statute governing “strategic lawsuits against public participation” (the anti-SLAPP statute).  The Superior Court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint in its entirety.

Weinstein appeals, arguing that (1) because he alleged and presented evidence that both he and his paralegal lost billable hours to respond to Narowetz’s complaints to the boards of overseers, and that he suffered mental injury, the Superior Court erred in determining that he had not alleged “actual injury” as required by the anti-SLAPP statute, and (2) the Superior Court committed an error of law by determining that Narowetz’s statements to the Board of Dental Practice were absolutely privileged.

Margaret Handlin, who worked for Broadreach Public Relations, LLC, reported to a coworker that Broadreach’s majority owner had engaged in drunken conduct at a private party hosted by the owner at a hotel that was a client of Broadreach’s and that the hotel did not want to work with the owner any further.  Broadreach terminated Handlin’s employment.

Handlin sued Broadreach under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) and the Maine Human Rights Act and for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Broadreach moved for summary judgment.  Handlin did not file an opposition to the motion.  The Superior Court entered summary judgment in favor of Broadreach.

Handlin moved for relief from the judgment, arguing that there was good cause for her failure to respond to the motion for summary judgment because her attorney did not see the email that served the motion on him.  The court denied the motion. 

Handlin appeals from the summary judgment, arguing that her report to her coworker of the owner’s behavior was protected conduct under the WPA because (1) the owner’s behavior was unlawful in that it constituted the crime of disorderly conduct and (2) the owner hosted the party at the hotel in order to increase the chances that the hotel would renew its contract with Broadreach, thereby making the party, and the owner’s behavior, connected to Broadreach’s business.

Handlin also appeals from the order denying her motion for relief from the judgment, arguing that M.R. Civ. P. 5 does not permit service by email of “any record in support of summary judgment in excess of 50 pages,” and that she was therefore not properly served with the motion.