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Tarbuck v. Jaeckel, attorneys & footnotes.

Attorneys for plaintiff:

David P. Lipman, Esq.
Tracie L. Adamson, Esq.
Lipman & Katz, P.A.
P O Box 1051
Augusta, ME 04332-1051

Attorney for defendant:

Ellyn C. Ballou, Esq.
P O Box 328
South Freeport, ME 04078-0328

Francis M. Jackson, Esq.
Jackson & MacNichol
P O Box 17713
Portland, ME 04112-8713
FOOTNOTES******************************** {1} . Jaeckel also argues that the District Court erred by not awarding her offsets for half of the proceeds from the sale of the Augusta property and for a handwritten "IOU" for $9000 she introduced in evidence to support her argument that the parties had entered subsequent agreements altering the terms of their divorce decree. Jaeckel failed to file counterclaims for either of these amounts, however, cf. M.R. Civ. P. 13(a) & (b), and is seeking these offsets for the first time on appeal to this Court. We have repeatedly stated that we will not address issues raised for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Berg v. Bragdon, 1997 ME 129, ¶ 9, 695 A.2d 1212, 1214. We therefore decline Jaekel's invitation to find error in the District Court's failure to address potential offsets that were not before it. See also Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Notis, 602 A.2d 1164, 1165 (Me. 1992) (noting "[r]ecoupment must be pleaded affirmatively, and if it is not raised it is ordinarily deemed waived"). {2} . Although we find that Jaeckel's arguments were sufficient to raise the issue of waiver of post-judgment interest, we stress that parties seeking a waiver of post-judgment interest should make it clear that they are petitioning for such relief. Waiver of post-judgment interest is the exception and not the rule. See 14 M.R.S.A. § 1602-A (Supp. 1999). {3} . We have created exceptions to this final judgment rule. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 1998 ME 32, ¶¶ 6-7, 706 A.2d 1038, 1039-40 ("judicial economy exception"). {4} . Although the Superior Court erroneously determined that Jaeckel had waived her argument regarding waiver of interest by not pursuing it on remand and therefore did not address the merits in her second appeal, it appears on the face of things that the doctrine of law of the case would have prevented the Superior Court from revisiting its previous decision on the issue anyway. Furthermore, the Superior Court's mandate on remand did not order that the issue of post-judgment interest be reconsidered, rather it simply ordered that interest be awarded. Therefore, it does not appear that reargument on the issue in the District Court would have been appropriate. {5} . Although the District Court did not make explicit findings of fact to support its denial of Tarbuck's request for post-judgment interest, Tarbuck failed to file a motion pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52 requesting such findings. We therefore must assume that the court made the necessary findings in support of its decision. See Markley v. Semle, 1998 ME 145, ¶ 4, 713 A.2d 945, 946 (noting that when a party does not move for specific findings of fact, we assume the trial court found all of the facts necessary to support its decision).

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