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Hilltop Comm. Sports Ctr. v. Hoffman
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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT					Reporter of Decisions
Decision:	2000 ME 130
Docket:	And-99-765
Argued:	May 1, 2000
Decided:	July 5, 2000




	[¶1] Randall and Karen Morin appeal from a judgment entered in the
Superior Court (Androscoggin County, Atwood J.) affirming a deficiency
judgment entered in the District Court (Lewiston, Gorman, J.) in favor of
Hilltop Community Sports Center, Inc. in the amount of $17,298.  The
judgment reflects the amount owed, as evidenced by a promissory note,
after the personal property securing the note had been sold and the
proceeds applied to the debt.  The Morins argue that because Hilltop failed
to give them proper notice of the sale of the property, the trial court erred
in allowing Hilltop to recover any deficiency.  We discern no error and affirm
the judgment.
	[¶2] On March 1, 1996, Randall and Karen Morin, along with their
business partners Michael and Linda Hoffman, purchased athletic and
exercise equipment and a customer list for their health and fitness center
from Hilltop, and they gave Hilltop a promissory note to evidence their debt
and executed a security agreement to secure the debt.  Shortly thereafter,
the Morins sold their interest in the fitness center to Joseph Daniel Sullivan
Jr., but they never obtained from Hilltop any release from their obligations
under the promissory note and security agreement.  Payments were made
on the obligations for only six months, at which point Sullivan and the
Hoffmans defaulted, with $37,098 still owing to Hilltop.
	[¶3] Hilltop filed a complaint in the District Court, and in April of
1997, Hilltop was granted possession of the personal property that was the
subject of the security agreement.  The court ordered Hilltop "to sell the
collateral at public or private sale as soon as practical and to give notice to
the debtors of any intended disposition."
	[¶4] On April 25, 1997, Hilltop notified the Morins that it would "sell
the collateral at private sale after May 8, 1997."  Between April 25 and May
8, the Morins did nothing to redeem the collateral.  On May 1, however,
prior to the date specified in the notice, Hilltop entered into an agreement
with Andy Valley Racquet Club, Inc.
	[¶5] On May 1, Paul Gosselin, attorney for Andy Valley Racquet Club,
delivered a letter to Paul Murphy, attorney for Hilltop, outlining the terms of
an agreement to purchase the collateral:
	Enclosed are the originals of the Asset Purchase and Sale
Agreement and Bill of Sale which have been executed by [Andy
Valley Racquet Club] in duplicate.  Also enclosed are our checks
in the total amount of $17,500.  These checks are tendered to
you on the understanding and condition that they will be held in
escrow and not released to your clients until the following have

. . . .

	3.You have delivered an executed original of the Purchase and Sale
Agreement and Bill of Sale; and

4.You have complied with all other terms and conditions of
the Purchase and Sale Agreement.

	. . . .

	In the event that the above conditions are not complied
with on or before May 15, 1997, you will return my client's
checks and our clients will retain all rights and remedies against
each other.
Murphy signed the letter indicating that he agreed to its terms.
	[¶6] Also on May 1, the parties signed a bill of sale which stated that
Hilltop, for consideration paid, "does hereby grant, sell, transfer and deliver
unto ANDY VALLEY RACQUET CLUB, INC., all of its right, title and interest
in and to the following goods."  Attached to the document were two exhibits
listing the property to be conveyed, and at the bottom of the document, the
following notation appeared: "Signed, Sealed and Delivered in presence of
Paul Murphy [/s/]."
	[¶7] Accompanying the bill of sale and the letter were two checks and
a purchase and sale agreement.  One check was in the amount of $1000 and
the other was for $16,500.  The purchase and sale agreement read, in part,
as follows:
	AGREEMENT made this 1st day of May, 1997, by and
between [Hilltop and Andy Valley Racquet Club] . . . .

	. . . .

	NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the promises and
covenants contained herein, it is hereby agreed as follows:

	1.	Sale of Assets:	The Seller agrees to sell, assign
and transfer to the Buyer on the closing date stated herein and
the Buyer agrees to buy from the Seller all of the assets
described [in the accompanying exhibits].  The Sale will be free
of all debts, claims, security interests or liabilities other than the
potential claim of Randall Morin, Karen Morin, Michael Hoffman
and Linda Morin . . . .

	. . . . 

	3.	Payment of Purchase Price:	Buyer will pay the
purchase price in the following manner.

	A.	A down payment of $1,500 upon execution of this
Agreement . . . .  Said down payment shall be a non-refundable
deposit, however, it will be applied as part payment toward the
purchase payment.  The balance of $16,000.00 shall be payable
at closing.

	4.	Closing Date:	The purchase of the assets shall
take place at the offices of Murphy & Coyne . . . not later than
fourteen (14) days from the date of this Agreement, unless
extended in writing by the parties.

	5.	Conditions:		This Agreement is pursuant to and
subject to the Order of the Eighth District Court dated April 8,
1997 a copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated
herein and further subject to notification to the debtors
described therein of sale and any valid objections then may be
raised prior to such sale by said debtors.
	[¶8] After the sale was complete, Hilltop sought a judgment against
the Morins for the amount still owed on the promissory note.  The Morins
challenged the sale, arguing that the notice they had received stating that
the sale would take place after May 8, 1997, was deficient because the sale
actually occurred on May 1, 1997.  Hilltop asserted that, though the
agreement was entered into on May 1, the sale did not occur until May 9. 
The District Court held two hearings to establish whether the notice
provided to the Morins was sufficient.
	[¶9] At the second hearing on September 15, 1998, Attorney Gosselin
testified that on May 1 he simultaneously delivered to Attorney Murphy the
letter, the purchase and sale agreement, the bill of sale, and the two checks. 
Gosselin also testified that he included both checks because the sale was
contentious and Murphy had required that there be "cash on the table."  To
protect his clients, however, Gosselin intended that the money be held in
escrow until the conditions outlined in the letter had been complied with.  
	[¶10] When Gosselin delivered the documents on May 1, he did not
believe that the transaction was complete.  On May 9, Gosselin received the
releases required by the purchase and sale agreement, as well as a signed
purchase and sale agreement and a signed bill of sale from Hilltop.
	[¶11] Jane Brainerd, co-owner of Hilltop, also testified at the hearing. 
She signed the purchase and sale agreement and the bill of sale on May 1,
but she did not receive any money at that time.  On May 9, Brainerd received
the checks from Attorney Murphy and deposited them in the bank.
	[¶12] Based on the terms of the written agreement and the extrinsic
evidence offered by Hilltop, the District Court found that the sale had
occurred on May 9, 1997, and that Hilltop had given the Morins sufficient
notice of the sale.  Following an unsuccessful appeal to the Superior Court,
the Morins filed this appeal. 
	[¶13]  In contending that the notice they received was inadequate, the
Morins maintain that the bill of sale, dated May 1 and signed by both parties,
is an integrated agreement and that the court erred by admitting parol
evidence and by concluding that the date of sale was May 9.  The court
concluded that the purchase and sale agreement, along with the letter, are
part of the written agreement and considered them in construing the
agreement.  Because the written agreement is ambiguous with respect to the
date on which the sale would become final, the trial court considered the
testimony of both Gosselin and Brainerd to ascertain the intent of the
parties with respect to the date on which the sale became final, and it
concluded that the sale became final on May 9.  
	[¶14] "When the Superior Court acts as an intermediate appellate
court, we directly review the decision of the District Court."  Bangor Publ'g
Co. v. Union St. Market, 1998 ME 37, ¶ 5, 706 A.2d 595, 597.
	[¶15] At the trial, Hilltop had the burden of establishing, as a
condition precedent for obtaining a deficiency judgment, that it provided
proper notification to the Morins, pursuant to 11 M.R.S.A. § 9-504(3)
(1995).{1}  See Camden Nat'l Bank v. St. Clair, 309 A.2d 329, 333 (Me. 1973). 
We have stated
that the reasons for requiring a creditor to give the defaulting
debtor notice of the impending disposition of the collateral are
to afford the debtor an opportunity to discharge the debt and
redeem the collateral, produce another purchaser, or see that
the sale is conducted in a commercially reasonable manner.  Any
aspect of a sale notice contrary to these purposes necessarily
prevents it from being a reasonable notification.
Peoples Heritage Sav. Bank v. Theriault, 670 A.2d 1391, 1393 (Me. 1996)
(citations omitted).
A.  The Documents Included in the Written Agreement
[¶16]  "The general rule is that in the absence of anything to
indicate a contrary intention, instruments executed at the same
time, by the same contracting parties, for the same purposes,
and in the course of the same transaction will be considered and
construed together, since they are, in the eyes of the law, one
contract or instrument."
Kandlis v. Huotari, 678 A.2d 41, 43 (Me. 1996) (quoting 17A Am. Jur. 2d
Contracts § 388 (1991)), quoted in Bumila v. Keiser Homes of Me., Inc.,
1997 ME 139, ¶ 12, 696 A.2d 1091, 1094.  Extrinsic evidence may be
offered to prove that separate writings should be read together as a single
transaction.  See Kandlis v. Huotari, 678 A.2d at 43 (relying, in part, on
affidavits to conclude that guarantee agreements signed by several
shareholders during a two week period were part of the same transaction). 
	[¶17]  Here, contrary to the contentions of the Morins, the bill of sale
cannot be read in isolation.  The purchase and sale agreement, the letter,
and the bill of sale, executed at the same time by the same contracting
parties, for the same purpose, in the course of the same transaction, and in
the absence of contrary intention, should be considered and construed
together because they are, in the eyes of the law, one contract or
instrument.  See Kandlis v. Huotari, 678 A.2d at 43; see also Rosenthal v.
Means, 388 A.2d 113, 115 (Me. 1978).
	[¶18]  Both the language of the purchase and sale agreement and the
letter make it clear the written agreement consisted of those documents
and the bill of sale.  Moreover, the court found that there was "no dispute
between the parties [to the sale] but that the conditions listed in Attorney
Gosselin's letter were part of the agreement between these parties."  That
factual finding is not clearly erroneous, supported as it is by testimony that
the letter was delivered together with the other documents and that the
attorney for Andy Valley Racquet Club intended and believed that the letter
was part of the agreement.  The finding is further supported by Jane
Brainerd's testimony that she was aware of the conditions imposed by the
Gosselin letter and that she agreed to them.  Accordingly, the District Court
committed no error in considering all of the written documents as parts of a
single agreement.
B.  Construction of the Written Agreement

	[¶19]  It must be determined whether the agreement, comprised as it
is of the several documents, is ambiguous, especially with respect to the
date the sale was to be finalized.  See Spottiswoode v. Levine, 1999 ME 79,
¶ 16, 730 A.2d 166, 172.  Whether a term in a contract is ambiguous is an
issue of law.  See id.  A contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to
more than one interpretation.  See Fitzgerald v. Gamester, 658 A.2d 1065,
1069 (Me. 1995).  
		[¶20] Here, the bill of sale acknowledges "receipt and delivery" of the
property on May 1, yet the purchase and sale agreement does not define a
closing date, simply stating that the purchase "shall take place . . . not later
than fourteen (14) days from the date of this Agreement."  Moreover, the
letter from Attorney Gosselin notes that certain conditions have to be met
before the sale is to be completed.  Given the conflicting statements in the
written documents, it is clear that the agreement is ambiguous with respect
to the date the sale was to be finalized.  
	[¶21] When a written agreement is ambiguous, the court must
determine the intent of the parties in entering that contract, and that
determination is a question of fact that we review for clear error.  See
Spottiswoode v. Levine, 1999 ME 79, ¶ 16, 730 A.2d at 172; see also Bangor
Publ'g Co. v. Union St. Market, 1998 ME 37, ¶ 5, 706 A.2d 595, 597.  To aid
it in construing the agreement, "the factfinder may 'entertain extrinsic
evidence casting light upon the intention of the parties with respect to the
meaning of the unclear language.'"  Bangor Publ'g Co. v. Union St. Market,
1998 ME 37, ¶ 5, 706 A.2d at 597 (quoting T-M Oil Co., Inc. v. Pasquale,
388 A.2d 82, 85 (Me. 1978)).  Accordingly, it was appropriate for the court
to accept extrinsic evidence to aid it in determining the date on which the
parties intended the sale to be finalized.{2}  See Bangor Publ'g Co. v. Union St.
Market, 1998 ME 37, ¶ 6, 706 A.2d at 597.
	[¶22] The court heard evidence that Gosselin and Brainerd both
understood and intended that the sale would not be complete until the
conditions in Gosselin's letter had been satisfied.  Moreover, Brainerd also
testified that she did not receive and deposit any money until May 9.  Finally,
Gosselin testified that he did not receive the signed bill of sale and the
signed purchase and sale agreement from Hilltop until May 9.  Given this
evidence and the language contained in the written agreement itself, the
court's finding that the sale did not take place until May 9 is supported by
the evidence and is not clearly erroneous.{3}
	The entry is:
			Judgment affirmed.

Attorneys for the plaintiff:

Coleman G. Coyne, Jr., Esq.     (orally)
Paul Murphy, Esq.
Murphy & Coyne
P.O. Box 1312
Lewiston, Maine 04243-1312

Attorney for the defendants:

John W. Conway, Esq.             (orally)
Linnell, Choate & Webber
83 Pleasant St.
P.O. Box 190
Auburn, Maine 04212-0190 
FOOTNOTES******************************** {1} . Title 11, section 9-504(3) provides, in part: Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings and may be made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels and at any time and place and on any terms but every aspect of the disposition including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable. Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place of any public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor. 11 M.R.S.A. § 9-504(3) (1995) (emphasis added). {2} . Because the written agreement is ambiguous with respect to the date the sale was to be finalized, we do not address the Morins' argument that extrinsic evidence was barred by the parol evidence rule because that rule applies only when extrinsic evidence is "offered to alter, augment, or contradict the unambiguous language of an integrated written agreement." See Handy Boat Serv., Inc. v. Professional Servs., Inc., 1998 ME 134, ¶ 11, 711 A.2d 1306, 1308-09 (emphasis added). {3} . The Morins also argue that Attorney Murphy was acting as an agent for Hilltop and not as an escrow agent on May 1 when Attorney Gosselin delivered the checks, the signed purchase and sale agreement, and the bill of sale on behalf of Andy Valley Racquet Club. They contend that because Murphy was Hilltop's agent, the sale was complete upon delivery of the signed documents. That argument fails for two reasons. First, an attorney for one party can act as an escrow agent in a transaction between his principal and another party, as long as his escrow role "'involves no violation of duty to the principal and the person acts as an individual and not as an agent." See Progressive Iron Works Realty Corp. v. Eastern Milling Co., 155 Me. 16, 19, 150 A.2d 760, 762 (1959) (quoting 30 C.J.S. Escrows § 7d). In making this determination, it is "the intention of the parties at the time of deposit [that] is controlling," see Progressive Iron Works Realty Corp. v. Eastern Milling Co., 155 Me. at 20, 150 A.2d at 762, and in this case the trial court's findings support the conclusion that Attorney Murphy properly acted as an escrow agent in this case. Second, even if Attorney Murphy acted solely as agent for Hilltop, the delivery of documents by Andy Valley Racquet Club did not operate to finalize the sale. Because the agreement called for the sale to be completed only after certain conditions were met, the sale was not finalized until those conditions were met and the documents were signed and delivered.