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DANA, J., dissenting.
	[¶34]  I must respectfully dissent.
	[¶35]  In its distribution of the marital property, it is not clear that the
court considered the extent of the debt it ordered Roger to pay.  When that
debt is considered, the magnitude of the allocation to Deborah is revealed. 
Although the court was aware that its allocation was disproportionate and
although it provided a rationale for a disproportionate allocation, because of
the manner of its presentation, we and the parties are left to speculate as to
whether the court fully understood the ramifications of its order.  My
colleagues give the trial court the benefit of the doubt.  We should not have
to guess.  Finally, in its award of child and spousal support and attorney fees,
the court appeared to consider only the parties' salaries and failed to
consider their relative net worths or other income.
	[¶36]  Although the trial court's thirty-five page opinion is extensive, it
is not clear that it appreciated that it awarded Deborah approximately 85%
of the marital net worth.  Even if the life insurance proceeds are excluded,
Deborah received over 70% of the remaining marital net worth.  It would be
helpful to the parties and to us in performing our appellate function if trial
courts would set forth in table form the marital and non-marital assets
awarded and the debts assigned to each party in a manner such as the
Eight shares in stock of family business	3,000{6}			3,000
										Asset		Debt		Net Asset
										Value		Owed		Value

Real estate							118,000	(52,000)	   66,000

Value of Deborah's interest in Roger's 
	business (note @ 7%)				 56,000					56,000

Life insurance proceeds				150,000					150,000

Lease of 1998 Ford Explorer			?{8}							?	

Jewelry								2,500						2,500

Home furnishings					  	7,000						7,000

Savings Bank account nos. 1 & 2  	1,708						1,708

IRA account						  	6,800						6,800

35 mm camera and video cameras	  	1,200						1,200      
Discover credit card debt						(1,835)		(1,835)      

	TOTAL MARITAL NET WORTH										289,373
											Asset		Debt		Net Asset
											Value		Owed		Value

Interest in Safe Approach, Inc.		112,000	(56,000)	56,000
1988 Century cabin cruiser 				29,000		(29,252)	(252)
Condo dock slip 							17,000					17,000

1969 GT OPEL 								6,200		(4,500)	1,700
1970 Elan snowmobile 					700						700

Morgan promissory note (4/14/98)		10,000					10,000

Power tools								7,000					7,000

Violin and home furnishings				3,000					3,000

IRA account no. 1							5,200					5,200

IRA account no. 2 						3,400					3,400

Reimburse Katie's Galaxy fund						(5,700)   (5,700)

Home equity loan 										(29,810)	(29,810)
Condominium fees 										(3,660)	(3,660)

Personal loan											(5,500)	(5,500)
VISA credit card debt								(4,500)	(4,500)

Loan from Andre Drouin 								(1,500)	(1,500)     
	TOTAL MARITAL NET WORTH								      53,078
	[¶37]  A court must take into account "[t]he value of the property set
apart to each spouse" as part of its disposition of the property.  19-A
M.R.S.A. § 953(1)(B) (1998).  Here, the overall distribution of the assets is
unbalanced, which in some circumstances amounts to an abuse of discretion. 
See Beattie v. Beattie, 650 A.2d 950, 952 (Me. 1994) (holding that, while
certain elements of the divorce judgment "may be supportable
independently, the evidence [did] not support the cumulative effect of the
judgment") (emphasis added).  The court's judgment does not demonstrate
that it understood the extent of its unequal division of marital property.
	[¶38]  The court's award of child support is based on the assumption
that Deborah's salary is her "gross income."  By ignoring Deborah's net
worth (especially the $150,000 from the insurance policy and Roger's
promissory note in the amount of $56,000 with interest accruing at 7%),
the court inflated Roger's support obligation.  According to the child
support guidelines, "[g]ross income includes income from an ongoing
source, including, but not limited to . . . interest . . . ."  19-A M.R.S.A.
§ 2001(5) (1998).  Two hundred thousand dollars in cash and notes is
certainly a source of ongoing income.  A court should consider all of
Deborah's "gross income" before making its child support determination.
	[¶39]  With respect to Deborah's need for support, the court did not
appear to consider any income from the proceeds of the $150,000 life
insurance policy and the 7% return on Roger's $56,000 note.  The Court
seeks to justify this deficiency by characterizing the income from the 7%
note and the $150,000 in cash as speculative because Roger may not pay the
note and "[c]onceivably, Deborah might use the insurance proceeds to satisfy
all her outstanding debt.  In this scenario there would be no additional
income to impute to Deborah."  Supra, Court's opinion at ¶ 24.  The Court
invites Roger to return to court when he begins paying his note to Deborah
or learns how Deborah invests her wealth.  The Court fails to mention the
transactional costs (primarily attorney fees) associated with doing so.
	[¶40]  Pursuant to the statute in effect at the time of the judgment,
the court must consider "[t]he income history and income potential of each
party."  19-A M.R.S.A. § 951(1)(E) (1998), repealed by P.L. 1999, ch. 634,
§ 2.  Determining the income generating capacity of cash and a 7% note is
infinitely less speculative than the trial court's valuing of Roger's closely
held company or its projecting of Roger's prospects for a bonus.
	[¶41]  When, as here, the court has ordered one party to pay the other
a certain amount in the form of an interest-bearing note,{9} the court should
take into account the interest income and interest expense.  The income is
not speculative, but has instead been ordered by the court and Roger may be
held in contempt for his failure to pay that interest.  See City of Rockland v.
Winchenbaugh, 667 A.2d 602, 604 (Me. 1995) ("Civil contempt is used to
secure obedience to court orders.  It is a coercive tool, available to parties
who seek to enforce a previously obtained judgment.") (citation omitted).
	[¶42]  The $150,000 in life insurance proceeds will similarly provide
a return regardless of how Deborah invests the money.  Whether she places
it in a money market account or invests it in her father's business, she can
be expected to receive some return on her investment.  For instance, if she
places the money in a bank certificate of deposit at 6%, she will receive
$9000 per year in income.  Moreover, even if she uses a portion of the
$150,000 to pay off some or all of her debts (the court assigned her
approximately $54,000 in debt), she will be saving the interest that would
have accrued on those debts.  The court should consider the parties' assets
and liabilities before making its spousal support determination.
	[¶43]  The Court concludes that standing alone the trial court's
finding regarding Roger's income justifies its decision to award attorney
fees.  We have said, however, that "[a]n award of attorney fees should be
based on the parties' relative capacity to absorb the costs of litigation . . . and
all relevant factors that serve to create an award that is fair and just under
the circumstances."  Largay v. Largay, 2000 ME 108, ¶ 16, 752 A.2d 194,
198 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted).  The court's
judgment does not indicate that it considered Roger's relative capacity to
service and retire over $140,000 in debt, to pay $6,500 in annual child
support, $7,800 in annual spousal support, 100% of his litigation costs, and
$4,000 of Deborah's attorney fees.

Attorney for plaintiff: Coleman G. Coyne Jr., Esq., (orally) Murphy and Coyne P O Box 1312 Lewiston, ME 04243-1312 Attorneys for defendant: Ronald P. Lebel, Esq., (orally) James E. Belleau, Esq. Skelton, Taintor & Abbott, P.A. P O Box 3200 Auburn, ME 04212
FOOTNOTES******************************** {1} . Section 953 states, in relevant part: 1. Disposition. In a proceeding for a divorce, . . . the court shall set apart to each spouse the spouse's property and shall divide the marital property in proportions the court considers just after considering all relevant factors, including: A. The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital property, including the contribution of a spouse as homemaker; B. The value of the property set apart to each spouse; and C. The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live in the home for reasonable periods to the spouse having custody of the children. . . . . 3. Acquired subsequent to marriage. All property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage and prior to a decree of legal separation is presumed to be marital property regardless of whether title is held individually or by the spouses in some form of coownership. . . . . . . . 19-A M.R.S.A. § 953(1) & (3) (1998 & Supp. 2000). {2} . We note that, given the facts of this case, Roger could have requested a deviation from the child support guidelines but apparently chose not to do so. See 19-A M.R.S.A. § 2007(3)(E) (1998) (providing that "criteria that may justify deviation from the support guidelines [include] . . . [t]he financial resources and needs of a party, including nonrecurring income not included in the definition of gross income . . . ."). {3} . 19-A M.R.S.A. § 951 states in relevant part: § 951. Spousal support 1. Factors. The court shall consider the following factors when determining an award of spousal support: A. The length of the marriage; B. The ability of each party to pay; C. The age of each party; D.The employment history and employment potential of each party; E. The income history and income potential of each party; F. The education and training of each party; G. The provisions for retirement and health insurance benefits of each party; H. The tax consequences of the division of marital property, including the tax consequences of the sale of the marital home, if applicable; I. The health and disabilities of each party; J. The tax consequences of a spousal support award; K. The contributions of either party as homemaker; L. The contributions of either party to the education or earning potential of the other party; M. Economic misconduct by either party resulting in the diminution of marital property or income; N. The standard of living of the parties during the marriage; and O. Any other factors the court considers appropriate. . . . . 19-A M.R.S.A. § 951(1) (1998). {4} . By operation of P.L.1999, ch. 634, § 2, 19-A M.R.S.A. § 951 has been repealed and replaced by 19-A M.R.S.A. § 951-A. {5} . We note that, at the time of the divorce hearing, Roger had the free use of a company vehicle, a 1998 Ford Expedition. Deborah was responsible for making a monthly lease payment of approximately $400 per month for her vehicle. {6} . The court found that Deborah owns eight of 200 shares of the stock in the family business. Her father testified the business was worth $75,000. Without a minority discount, her proportionate interest would be worth $3,000. {7} . The court failed to provide values for the items in italics. I have used Roger's financial affidavit to estimate values not found by the court. The question marks also indicate missing information. {8} . The balance owed on the lease was $2,035 as of July 31, 1999, according to Roger's financial affidavit. The court did not attach a value to the leasehold interest in the vehicle. {9} . The court stated that the promissory note would "bear interest at the rate of 7% per year on the unpaid balance and shall be payable within 5 years from the date of said note which date shall [be] on or within 14 days of this judgment."